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Abstract 
While European elections are often seen as remote from EU issues, considerations specifically linked to the EU came to 
the forefront in the wake of the 2014 European elections: the economic and financial crisis, the new process of designa-
tion of the European Commission President, and the alleged increase of Eurosceptic votes. This increased salience of 
political debates about the EU asks for a reconsideration of the ‘second-order nature’ of European elections. In this 
context, as in 2009, the Belgian electorate voted for the regional and European levels on the very same day. Belgian 
voters were thus offered the opportunity to split their ticket between both levels. This allows comparing the occurrence 
and determinants of these ‘immediate switching’ behaviours in 2014 with those of the presumably less politicized EP 
elections in 2009. We do that by employing the 2009 and 2014 PartiRep Election Study data. On the one hand, the arti-
cle shows that split-ticket voting cannot be explained by economic voting, European identity, and attitudes towards in-
tegration in 2014. On the other hand, the unique configuration of the Belgian elections enables us to observe that the 
introduction of Spitzenkandidaten did enhance split-ticket voting for voters who could directly vote for this candidate 
(in Flanders), while this did not increase split-ticket voting among voters who could only indirectly support the candi-
date (in Wallonia). 
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1. Introduction 
In multi-level political systems, voters are offered the 
opportunity to cast votes for several elections. These 
different contests are, however, not independent from 
each other. Sub-national and supra-national elections 
in Western European countries are bound to be tainted 
by national level considerations both in political cam-
paigns and their electoral outcomes. If sub-national 
and supra-national elections have been introduced in 
an attempt to provide more legitimacy to these tiers of 
government, such legitimacy claims rest on the un-
proven assumption that voters vote according to level-
specific motives. In the case of the European Union 
(EU), scholars have often shown that elections for the 
European Parliament (EP) are simply not about Europe 
(Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Føllesdal & Hix, 2006). Due to 
low levels of politicization of European integration, EU 
issue voting is often considered, at best, a ‘sleeping gi-
ant’ (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004; de Vries, 2007). At 
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the same time, however, the integration process has 
resulted in a shift of a broad range of competences to 
the supra-national level. Few political domains are not 
affected by EU-level decision-making: Europe is nearly 
everywhere. This article aims to increase insights into 
the ways in which voters deal with this apparent para-
dox. What are EP elections about according to citizens? 
Are they about Europe at all? And if so, what specific 
EU issues are at stake? 
In Belgium, electoral results of the 2014 EP elec-
tions clearly differed from those of the 2009 elections 
(see Table 1). Differences in party choices, however, do 
not tell us how and why these elections were different 
from previous contests. To answer these questions, we 
should shed light on vote motives.  
Table 1. Results of the 2009 and 2014 EP Elections by 
region (%). Source: verkiezingen2014.be 
 2009 2014 Difference 
Flanders    
CD&V 23.54 20.14 -3.40 
Groen 7.84 10.57 +2.73 
N-VA 9.71 26.91 +17.20 
Open VLD 20.02 19.92 -0.10 
PvdA+ 1.01 2.42 +1.41 
sp.a 13.60 13.24 -0.36 
Vlaams Belang 15.82 6.80 -9.02 
Wallonia    
cdH 13.42 11.65 -1.77 
Ecolo 22.00 10.90 -11.1 
FDF / 2.27 +2.27 
MR 24.78 27.44 +2.66 
PP / 6.64 +6.64 
PS 30.50 29.66 -0.84 
PTB-GO 1.19 5.68 +4.49 
Note: Percentages of vote share within each region are 
presented. 
Given the simultaneity of the two types of elections, 
both in 2009 and in 2014, this article studies split-ticket 
voting between European and regional elections. Split-
ticket voting refers to voting for different parties for 
different offices which are being decided upon in a sin-
gle election day. In 2014, the highest aggregate level 
effects of split-ticket voting between regional and EP 
elections were observed for the Open VLD (which 
scored 5.7 per cent higher in European elections), the 
N-VA (which scored 5.0 per cent lower in EP elections), 
the cdH (with a 3.5 per cent difference), and Ecolo 
(+2.3 per cent in EP elections). To understand the ra-
tionale of split-ticket voting, however, it is necessary to 
further explore its determinants at the individual-level.  
In this study, we use the Belgian case to examine 
motives of differentiated vote choices between Euro-
pean and other (here: regional) elections. As in most of 
the EU (and especially Eurozone) member states, the 
economic and financial crisis was high on the political 
agenda in Belgium. Besides that, the Belgian case also 
provides a unique opportunity to test whether the in-
troduction of Spitzenkandidaten had an effect on vot-
ing behaviours. Since the Dutch and French language 
communities in Belgium have separate party systems 
(Brack & Pilet, 2010), and as a Spitzenkandidat was on-
ly running as a MEP candidate in the Dutch language 
community, we can test the effect of this new mecha-
nism introduced in the 2014 EP elections in two differ-
ent situations. Citizens of the Dutch language commu-
nity could directly vote for this candidate; citizens of 
the French language community could only indirectly 
support this candidate. This peculiar situation is un-
doubtedly the main added value of the Belgian case to 
our attempt to explore new possible reasons for split-
ticket voting in EP elections. It enables us to test to 
what extent the newly introduced electoral connection 
between EP elections and the designation of the Presi-
dent of the European Commission—often seen as the 
ultimate attempt to introduce a ‘quasi-parliamentary 
system’ (Hobolt, 2014, p. 1532)—has gained any con-
sideration among those it was directed at: the Europe-
an citizens.  
Thus, this article contributes to the debate of the 
(alleged) growing politicization of EU integration (de 
Wilde, 2011). It argues that because of the increased 
salience of European issues prior to the 2014 elections 
(the economic and financial crisis, the introduction of 
Spitzenkandidaten and more generally the alleged on-
going politicization of EU integration), voters are ex-
pected to have based their EP vote more often on Eu-
ropean-specific motives rather than on considerations 
related to national or regional politics. Voting for a dif-
ferent party in EP elections than in other contests 
should increasingly be the result of EU-specific vote 
motives. Accordingly, this article tests whether reasons 
for split-ticket voting in 2014 differed from reasons for 
split-ticket voting in 2009. 
2. Split-Ticket Voting: Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1. Explaining Split-Ticket Voting 
Split-ticket voting has originally been examined in the 
American two-party system, where several ‘classical’ 
explanations for ballot-splitting have been put forth. 
Differentiated vote choices in concurrent elections can 
first and foremost be linked to the general trend to-
ward candidate-centred politics. On the one hand, 
split-ticket voting has been seen as the result of specif-
ic trends of the party system such as declining party 
loyalty, the weakening of party apparatuses, media-
centred campaigns, or the surge in incumbents’ ad-
vantage (Wattenberg, 1991). On the other hand, fund-
ing, visibility, or the quality of a candidate (and notably 
his/her political experience—Jacobson, 1990) can re-
sult in voting for a particular candidate, even though 
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this candidate is part of a different party than the one 
usually supported by a given voter (Beck, Baum, 
Clausen, & Smith, 1992; Burden & Helmke, 2009; Bur-
den & Kimball, 1998; Roscoe, 2003). Hence, both fea-
tures of the system and of particular candidates can 
lead to ‘candidate effects’ resulting in split-ticket vot-
ing. Another set of explanations more simply suggests 
that voters look for different things in different elec-
tions (Jacobson, 1990), thus expressing arena-specific 
votes. Party preferences would differ in the two arenas 
precisely because something else is at stake in the two 
different elections. An additional account of voters’ 
choices is offered by the policy-balancing model (Ales-
sina & Rosenthal, 1995; Fiorina, 1992), whereby voters 
situated ‘in between’ two parties may choose to alter-
nate their choices in order to maximize their policy 
preferences overall.  
Ever since the first direct elections of the EP in 
1979, major differences in voting behaviour between 
European and other—above all, national—elections 
have been pinpointed. They have almost invariably 
been analysed through the prism of the ‘second-order’ 
model (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). Although the model orig-
inally did not directly focus on split-ticket voting, it did 
put forth explanations related to divergent electoral 
outcomes in different electoral contests: European 
elections are marked by higher abstention levels, and 
better electoral results of small and opposition par-
ties—as opposed to large and governmental ones. Why 
do voters vote differently in European elections? Vot-
ers are deemed to consider European elections as less 
important than first-order, national elections and are 
expected to use these supra-national elections to ex-
press opinions about national-level issues (Reif, 1984, 
1985; Schmitt, 2005). It is assumed that domestic is-
sues dominate European ones when it comes down to 
vote choices for European elections (Reif, 1984, 1985). 
This recognised absence of genuine European elections 
is one of the crucial elements of the endemic ‘EU demo-
cratic deficit’: “European Parliament elections are [not] 
really ‘European’ elections: they are not about the per-
sonalities and parties at the European level or the direc-
tion of the EU policy agenda” (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006, pp. 
535-536). Developments of the model have tried to 
understand how national issues are mobilised in EP 
votes and result in differentiated votes. They have 
highlighted specific voting behaviours such as ‘sanc-
tioning the government’ (Hix & Marsh, 2007), or ‘sin-
cere voting’ as opposed to the ‘useful’ votes expressed 
in national elections (Marsh & Mikhaylov, 2010). 
The second-order model thus accounts for different 
electoral outcomes in different electoral contests, 
through national vote motives. At the same time, the 
literature has increasingly come to acknowledge that 
European elections are to some extent about Europe 
(de Vries & Tillman, 2011; Mattila, 2003; Schuck, Xezo-
nakis, Elenbaas, Banducci, & de Vreese, 2011), and 
much more so than they previously were (Hobolt, 
Spoon, & Tilley, 2009). This apparent paradox can be 
solved by reconsidering the main assumption of the 
‘second-order’ model, which states that domestic is-
sues dominate, but do not necessarily monopolise the 
European electoral arena. Hence, the question be-
comes: how different vote motives pertaining to differ-
ent levels are articulated in explaining votes in Europe-
an elections, compared to other (first-order) elections.  
The Belgian case offers an opportunity to reconsid-
er this model in instances of simultaneous elections. 
Based on the above presented literature on split-ticket 
voting and on the ‘second-order’ model, we assume 
that voters who vote differently in two (or more) con-
comitant contests use a specific reasoning when cast-
ing a vote for the ‘less important’ contest (here: Euro-
pean elections). We can thus put forth explanations of 
why certain voters choose to vote differently in EP 
elections than in more ‘first-order’ elections: national 
elections, which remain the main reference point, but 
also regional elections. Furthermore, a number of 
structural and contextual characteristics of the Belgian 
political system challenge some of the core features of 
the ‘second-order’ model, which makes the country a 
good case for studying whether the changed context in 
which the EP elections took place in 2009 and 2014 af-
fected split-ticket voting.  
First, regarding the structural characteristics of the 
system, while lower participation levels in European 
elections is one of the three main pillars on which the 
model is based, compulsory voting in Belgium annihi-
late most interpretations regarding participation. Sec-
ond, in multipolar systems like Belgium, a number of 
medium size parties enter electoral competition, blur-
ring the differentiation between small and large organ-
isations, which constitute the first reference of the 
model in terms of vote transfers. Third, as a ‘consocia-
tion’ that consists of governments at various policy-
levels, many parties usually take part in government at 
one level or the other. As a consequence, there is often 
no clear ‘alternation’ in power and the distinction be-
tween governmental and non-governmental parties is 
curtailed. Accordingly, voting behaviours which rest on 
the assumption that voters have clear pictures of who 
governs and who is likely to govern—such as ‘sanction-
ing the government’ or ‘tactical voting’—are less likely 
to occur. A final structural characteristic of the Belgian 
case is that, as a federal state, the importance of the 
different regions brings into question the originally 
admitted dichotomous distinction between national 
first-order elections and a second-order category en-
compassing all other contests. In fact, the degree of 
importance that voters attach to regional elections has 
been shown to vary with the distribution of compe-
tences between the central state and the regions 
(Chhibber & Kollman, 2004). The more competences 
attributed to the regions, the more likely it is that re-
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gional elections will escape the logics of second-
orderness (Jeffery & Hough, 2009). In federal or quasi-
federal states, where regions exert a real legislative 
power, voters tend to give more consideration to their 
regional elections. These contests should be consid-
ered on a continuum as less of second-order or even 
more of ‘first-order’ nature (Cutler, 2008; Jeffery & 
Hough, 2009; Van der Eijk, Franklin, & Marsh, 1996). 
Belgium is precisely a highly decentralized federal state 
in which the regions (and communities) have been at-
tributed extensive competences1. Its regional elections 
can hence be reasonably assumed to escape the ‘sec-
ond-order’ ranking and the choice of voters is likely to 
be largely influenced by factors specific to regional pol-
itics. As such, regional considerations should be 
brought in as part of the (first-order) explanation of 
ticket-splitting.  
Secondly, and turning to contextual features, the 
initial model has often carefully ignored instances of 
simultaneous elections, although later research has re-
incorporated them (Heath, McLean, Taylor, & Curtice, 
1999; Van Aelst & Lefevere, 2012). Electoral cycles, 
however, are part and parcel of the model. The sanc-
tioning effect is expected to be stronger when Europe-
an elections act as ‘intermediary elections’ (Parodi, 
1983) or as ‘mid-terms’ (as in the ‘punishment and pro-
test’ explanation of Hix & Marsh, 2007). By contrast, 
sanctioning behaviour is expected to be weaker when 
EP elections are held closer to first-order ones—either 
directly after or just before—suggesting that there 
would be less vote-switching or even bonuses for gov-
erning parties in such instances (Reif, 1985). In this re-
gard, Belgian voters have been confronted with an ex-
treme case of such closeness in both 2009 and 2014. 
In sum, with its consociational, federal and multi-
party system, and taking into account the concomi-
tance of elections, Belgium is clearly a ‘least likely case’ 
of voting behaviours in European elections dictated by 
the logics of the ‘second-order’ model. These charac-
teristics theoretically limit the sanctioning effect to a 
large extent, leaving space for other—issue driven—
vote motives. In the Belgian case it is more likely that a 
split vote is based on EU-specific considerations rather 
than on national considerations. If voters would take 
first-order preferences into account, they are expected 
to vote for the same party in both elections. 
This article questions to what extent European elec-
tions are still of ‘second-order’ by examining whether 
split-ticket voting can be at least partly and increasingly 
linked to EU-specific motives. Hobolt et al. (2009) 
                                                          
1 The Sixth State Reform has most recently (2011–2013) pro-
ceeded with a considerable transfer of competences and has 
given broad fiscal autonomy to the regions, largely resulting in 
moving the centre of gravity of public policies from the Federal 
Government to the federated entities (Sautois & Uyttendaele, 
2013).  
showed that voters might base their votes on both Eu-
ropean and domestic issues. Hence, both vote motives 
are not mutually exclusive. In 2009, Van Aelst and 
Lefevere (2012) studied why people voted differently 
in the 2009 regional and European elections in Bel-
gium. They showed that at least a part of the elec-
torate was driven by Euro-specific motivations. Our 
study contributes to this debate by introducing a com-
parison between 2009 and 2014, hence allowing for a 
first appreciation of a possible evolution. Such evolu-
tion is expected for two main reasons: EU matters are 
increasingly salient, and attitudes regarding (especially 
against) current developments of the EU have gained 
considerable attention. We expect that: 
H1: Motives of split-ticket voting are likely to differ 
between 2009 and 2014. In 2014, split-ticket 
motives were more likely to entail EU-specific 
considerations. 
2.2. Looking for EU-Specific Motives  
This article studies why voters split their ticket, examin-
ing the extent to which EU-specific motives can be part 
of the explanation of such behaviour in the context of 
what are usually considered as ‘second-order’ elections. 
This second section first puts forth EU arena-specific 
considerations before turning to candidate effects ex-
planations. As such, we offer a continuation, a test, and 
an addition to previous studies on voting behaviour in 
EP elections. Far from dismissing the ‘second-order’ 
model, we reassess it in light of a ‘least likely case’. By 
reviewing EU-specific motives, this article tackles the 
question whether the increased salience of European 
issues prior to the 2014 elections due to the economic 
and financial crisis, the introduction of Spitzenkandi-
daten, and thus the alleged ongoing politicization of EU 
integration influenced motives for split-ticket voting in 
EP elections. In these posited more politicized EP elec-
tions, voters are expected to have based their vote 
more often on European-specific motives than on con-
siderations related to national or regional politics. 
2.2.1. Reincorporating Arena-Specific Considerations 
EU-specific considerations can drive split-ticket voting. 
Carruba and Timpone, for instance, suggested that ‘Eu-
rope matters’ in the sense that voters actively express 
different preferences at the EU level and at the nation-
al level (Carruba & Timpone, 2005, p. 279). They 
showed that voting for a green party at the European 
level could not be reduced to a vote for a small party or 
against the government (as argued in the ‘second-order’ 
elections theory). In the same vein, Hong recently 
demonstrated that European considerations matter in 
vote switching towards niche parties for European elec-
tions (Hong, 2015). ‘Europe’ would thus have become a 
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subject-matter of its own, politicized and important 
enough to constitute a factor of voters’ decisions in elec-
tions (de Vries & Tillman, 2011; de Vries, van der Brug, 
van Egmond, & van der Eijk, 2011; Hobolt & Wittrock, 
2011). In other words, Europe as an issue may constitute 
one motivational basis for choosing a particular party. 
Reasonably, if European issues had played a role in vot-
ers’ decision, they would primarily have been expressed 
at that level, likely resulting in split-ticket voting.  
One factor possibly leading to an EU-specific vote in 
EP elections (and to one that differs from one’s vote in 
other elections) is the strength of an individual’s Euro-
pean identity. The importance attributed to a specific 
ballot can be linked to perceptions of the institution, 
and specifically to how voters perceive the institution 
as legitimately representing them (Rohrschneider & 
Loveless, 2011). As citizens with a stronger European 
identity feel part of the community that is (aimed to 
be) represented by the EP, those citizens with a 
stronger European identity are expected to attach 
more importance to EP elections (Verhaegen, 2015). As 
a result, voters with a stronger European identity are 
expected to more often specifically think about their 
policy preferences for the EU community they are part 
of when casting their vote in EP elections. 
Another EU-related reason to vote differently in EP 
elections than in other elections are attitudes about EU 
integration. A considerable amount of recent studies 
suggests that EU attitudes increasingly affect party 
choice in EP elections (de Vries, 2007, 2009, 2010; de 
Vries et al., 2011; Evans, 1998, 2002; Hobolt et al., 
2009). Eurosceptic votes linked to worries about the ef-
fects of EU policy and dissatisfaction with mainstream 
politics lie at the heart of Eurosceptic parties’ success 
(Treib, 2014). In a context characterized by greater po-
liticization, it is more likely that attitudes towards the 
EU influence electoral decisions. This process whereby 
the EU has become an issue in itself is referred to as 
‘EU issue voting’ by de Vries (2007). Hence, it seems 
logical to assume that split-ticket voters may be turning 
to other parties in EP elections out of a positive or neg-
ative general attitude towards the EU2. As such, ticket-
splitting could be attributed to various attitudes of the 
electorate towards different contests that are held 
simultaneously, but can also be attributed to different 
motives much in line with the arena-specific vote mo-
tives argument (Jacobson, 1990).  
                                                          
2 Note that the literature has underlined the need to consider 
citizens who are neither Europhile nor Eurosceptic as well (de 
Vries, 2013; Duchesne, Frazer, Haegel, & Van Ingelgom, 2013; 
Rose & Borz, 2015; Stoeckel, 2013; Van Ingelgom, 2012, 2014). 
Citizens that are indifferent and/or ambivalent towards Euro-
pean integration could be expected either to be more volatile 
and split their ticket or not to participate (the latter not really 
applying in Belgium due to compulsory voting). However, we 
lack indicators, as questions measuring indifference and am-
bivalence were not included in the surveys.  
Besides these diffused factors of identity and atti-
tudes about EU integration, policy-issues may also lead 
to an EU-specific vote. By 2014, some policy areas such 
as the economic and monetary union, security, migra-
tion, or the environment gained unprecedented sali-
ence. Kriesi and Grande (2015) showed that events 
such as the Greek crisis and bailout, the Irish bailout, 
and the fiscal compact translated into an increased sa-
lience of the EU in media coverage and in the public 
debate. Hobolt and Tilley (2014) also established that 
this increased salience of the Euro crisis translated into 
an increased awareness among citizens about the Euro 
crisis. Citizens even tended to perceive the EU as re-
sponsible for the economic situation in their country, 
rather than seeing this as a responsibility of the na-
tional government. To this regard, a particularly prolific 
theory, economic voting3, is precisely concerned with 
the impact of economic perceptions or situations on 
the probability of voting for incumbents or for any oth-
er party (Duch & Stevenson, 2006). The economic vot-
ing phenomenon has often been studied through the 
vote function (Kramer, 1971; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 
2000), which refers to the evolution of the vote for in-
cumbents or for other parties, and entails both eco-
nomic and political variables as explanations of vote 
choices (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994). Applying eco-
nomic voting to European elections entails that voters 
who associate economic matters with the EU are ex-
pected to vote for European elections based on eco-
nomic considerations since they perceive the EU-level 
as particularly relevant on these matters. This may lead 
to voting for a different party in EP elections, than in 
national or regional elections, as the consideration for 
the economy is in this case made specifically about the 
EU-level. 
Overall, we argue that especially for the 2014 EP 
elections, a number of EU arena-specific considerations 
are potential explanations of split-ticket voting. Thus, 
motives related to the EU or European politics are ex-
pected to increase the likelihood of voting differently in 
regional and EP elections in Belgium (Van Aelst & Lefe-
vere, 2012, p. 6). More precisely, we expect that:  
H2a: Voters with a stronger European identity are 
more likely to split their ticket, especially in 2014. 
H2b: Voters with more positive attitudes about EU 
integration are more likely to split their ticket, 
especially in 2014. 
H2c: Voters who grant more importance to the 
economy are more likely to split their ticket, 
especially in 2014.  
                                                          
3 For literature reviews of economic voting theory see, among 
others: Lewis-Beck (1990), Norpoth, Lewis-Beck, & Lafay (1991), 
Dorussen & Taylor (2001). 
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 1, Pages 116-129 121 
We will further explain and explore these relationships 
in the third part of the article.  
2.2.2. Candidate Effects 
A number of authors have argued that limited levels of 
candidate voting in EP elections contribute to the ab-
sence of genuinely ‘European’ elections (Føllesdal & 
Hix, 2006). In 2014, however, the first application of a 
provision enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon has brought 
expectations of change in this regard. As of 2014, the 
elections of the EP should be taken into account by the 
European Council in the designation of the President of 
the European Commission (art.17 TEU). The interpreta-
tion put forth by the European Parliament is that the 
President of the Commission is to come from the party 
group that received the largest vote share in the Euro-
pean elections, urging political parties at European lev-
el (the so-called ‘Europarties’) to designate their ‘lead 
candidate’4. The Europarties and the Parliament adver-
tised that a vote for a particular party in the EP elec-
tions implies a vote for the ‘lead candidate’, or 
‘Spitzenkandidat’, of the corresponding Europarty. Ho-
bolt (2014) observed that the awareness about this 
electoral connection between a vote for the EP and the 
selection of a new President of the European Commis-
sion differed between member states where voters 
could directly vote for such a candidate (i.e. where a 
‘lead candidate’ of a given Europarty was also a candi-
date to the EP for a national party), and member states 
where only the mechanism of indirect support for a 
candidate was possible.  
In Belgium, although Guy Verhofstadt was known 
as former Prime Minister in 2009, we can assume that 
his visibility—at least partly attributable to his role as 
group President of the ALDE—in the past EP legislature 
(2009–2014) has established him as a major European 
figure. Switching to Verhofstadt would hence be in line 
with the ‘candidate-effect’ identified by the split-ticket 
voting literature. Although we cannot clearly establish 
whether voting for him is based on clear ‘European 
motives’ or tainted with considerations about the role 
of Belgium in Europe if Verhofstadt would become the 
President of the Commission (which would amount to 
a kind of strategic voting), both possibilities are linked 
to European considerations. In the Dutch-speaking 
community in Belgium, the candidate of the ALDE party 
for the Commission Presidency was on the Open VLD 
list. Thus, Verhofstadt’s candidacy for President of the 
Commission is expected to have a (candidacy) effect on 
split-ticket voting. Following the literature on candida-
cy effects, it can be expected that Verhofstadt’s candi-
dacy encouraged part of the Flemish voters to vote for 
                                                          
4 European Parliament, Resolution of 22 November 2012 on 
the elections to the European Parliament in 2014 (2012/ 
2829(RSP)). 
Open VLD and specifically to vote for Verhofstadt in EP 
elections, even if they voted for a different party in re-
gional elections. In the French language community, 
voters who want to support Verhofstadt’s candidacy 
for President of the Commission can be expected to 
vote for MR as this indirectly supports the candidacy of 
Verhofstadt (MR is also part of the ALDE Europarty). 
According to this reasoning, voters who turned to 
Open VLD or MR in the 2014 EP elections were more 
likely to do so for EU-specific motives, and more pre-
cisely for a specific ‘European’ candidate. Because of 
this, we expect that: 
H3a: Voting for Open VLD or MR in EP elections 
more often led to a split-ticket vote. 
H3b: Voting for Verhofstadt in EP elections more 
often led to a split-ticket vote among voters of the 
Dutch language community. 
3. Data and Methods 
The data of the PartiRep Elections Study 2009 and 
20145 are used in this article as they allow for compar-
ing explanations for split-ticket voting between the two 
most recent EP elections. In these studies, a geograph-
ically stratified random sample of eligible voters in 
Flanders and Wallonia was drawn from the national 
registry. The 2009 study was carried out in three 
waves, two before and one after the elections of June 
7th, 2009. The 2014 study was carried out in two 
waves, one before and one after the elections of May 
25th, 2014. Different respondents participated in the 
2009 and the 2014 study. While a short panel study 
was carried out in both election years, it has to be not-
ed that we do not use panel data from 2009 to 2014. In 
the first wave of each study, respondents were inter-
viewed face-to-face about their personal background, 
opinions, interests, political activities, and voting be-
haviour. In the other survey waves, the respondents 
were interviewed by phone about the votes they cast-
ed, their vote motives, and the election campaign. In 
2009, the first interview was completed by 2,331 re-
spondents (1,204 Flemish and 1,127 Walloon), 1,845 
respondents completed the survey in the second wave, 
and 1,698 respondents also completed the third sur-
vey. In 2014, the interview was completed by 2,019 re-
                                                          
5 We use the PartiRep Election Study 2009 and 2014. PartiRep 
is a network and a research project focusing on changing pat-
terns of participation and representation in modern democra-
cies. PartiRep is formally an Interuniversity Attraction Pole 
(IAP) funded by the Belgian Science Policy (Belspo). It involves 
the universities of Antwerp (Universiteit Antwerpen), Brussels 
(Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Université libre de Bruxelles), 
Leiden (Universiteit Leiden), Leuven (KU Leuven), Louvain-La-
Neuve (Université Catholique de Louvain), and Mannheim 
(Universität Mannheim). 
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spondents (1,008 Flemish and 1,011 Walloon), which 
accounts for an acceptable response rate of 45 per 
cent. In the second wave, 1,470 respondents complet-
ed the survey. To account for the disproportionate 
non-response rate according to age, gender, and edu-
cation level, weights are used throughout the analyses. 
Indicators for the concepts of interest in this research 
(European vote motives, economic vote motives, and 
information on voting for a Spitzenkandidat) are in-
cluded in the data. 
In both studies, respondents were asked which top-
ic they find most important to take into account when 
deciding upon their vote. In the 2009 study, ‘the finan-
cial crisis’ was in the list of options. In 2014, ‘econom-
ics’ was included as an option. These questions are 
used as measures for economic motives for split-ticket 
voting. As measures for European vote motives, atti-
tudes about EU integration, and European identity are 
included. Attitudes about EU integration are measured 
on a scale from 0 to 10 whereby ‘0’ means respondents 
think that European integration already went too far, 
‘5’ that it is fine as it is, and ‘10’ that they would like 
the EU to further integrate. European identity is meas-
ured by asking respondents to which geographic or cul-
tural community they feel they belong to in the first 
place and in the second place. A dummy variable is 
constructed with the respondents who opted for Eu-
rope in the first place or in the second place receive 
code ‘1’, and respondents that did not choose Europe 
receive code ‘0’6. Voters with a stronger European 
identity are expected to attach more importance to EP 
elections (Bruter, 2008; Ehin, 2008; Verhaegen, 2015). 
As a result, they are expected to invest more consider-
ation in their vote for the EP, which is more likely to re-
sult in a split-ticket vote based on EU vote motives. On 
the contrary, voters with a strong regional identity 
might focus on regional elections and just follow the 
same line in EP elections, which they perceive as less 
important in comparison to voters with a strong Euro-
pean identity. Also, regional identity is included as a 
dummy variable (using the same survey questions 
about feeling of belonging to particular geographic and 
cultural communities) to set the effect of European 
identity against the potential effect of regional identity. 
The hypothesized effect of the introduction of 
Spitzenkandidaten requires an extra test of the effect 
of voting for a specific candidate. To examine the effect 
on split-ticket voting of the fact that former Belgian 
Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt was running as 
Spitzenkandidat for the ALDE, we tested whether re-
spondents who voted for a liberal party (Open VLD 
among Flemish respondents and MR among Walloon 
                                                          
6 As a robustness test, we replicated the analysis of the 2014 da-
ta with a more elaborate measure of European identity. This 
analysis led to the same result as when using the binary variable: 
European identity is not significantly related to split-ticket voting. 
respondents) were more likely to have also split their 
ticket. Also, in 2014 we assessed whether the candi-
date effect (if any) in Flanders can be explained by spe-
cifically voting for Verhofstadt. 
We also introduced other variables in order to 
check for alternative explanations of split-ticket voting. 
A first alternative explanation is uncertainty of party 
preference or of allegiance. It is expected that when 
voters like multiple parties or are not strongly attached 
to just one party, they might vote for different parties 
in different elections (here: regional and European) in 
order to express their support for different parties. This 
is also seen as ‘balancing’ between different prefer-
ences and positions (Giebler & Wagner, 2015). On the 
one hand, this can be measured by vote switching be-
tween the election that took place during the study, 
and the most recent previous election. On the other 
hand, an indicator is included that displays whether the 
vote intention of the respondent in the first wave of 
the study matches the vote in the election. A compari-
son is made with the actual vote in the regional elec-
tion of 2009 and 2014 respectively because the ques-
tions about the vote choice in the most recent previous 
election, and about vote intention, were measured for 
regional and federal elections only, which are theoreti-
cally of or closer to first-order classification. This in-
formation is not available for voting in EP elections. A 
second alternative explanation for split-ticket voting is 
voting for a specific candidate, rather than for a party. 
The specific characteristics of a candidate might attract 
support of a voter, quasi-independently from which 
party the candidate is attached. This might lead to 
split-ticket voting as the party of the candidate is seen 
as of little importance. In the 2009 study, respondents 
were asked about their vote motives for EP elections in 
an open question. We use the coding of Van Aelst and 
Lefevere (2012) who attributed the code ‘1’ to re-
spondents who referred to a specific candidate in their 
vote motive. Respondents who did not mention a can-
didate or candidates received the code ‘0’. In the 2014 
study, respondents were directly asked whether they 
voted for the party in general, or for a specific candi-
date (or multiple candidates). A dummy variable is con-
structed where voting for a candidate received ‘1’.  
Finally, control variables are included in the analyses. 
Education level is included as individual resources, such 
as education level, influences political sophistication. 
Similarly, political interest and political knowledge are 
related to political sophistication. More sophisticated 
reasoning that combines different vote motives and 
strategies may drive split-ticket voting. Also, citizens 
with a higher educational level, who know more about 
politics and who are more interested in politics, are 
more likely to be in favour of EU integration and have a 
stronger European identity (Fligstein, 2008; Verhaegen 
& Hooghe, 2015). Political sophistication could thus po-
tentially moderate the relationship between attitudes 
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about and identifications with the EU and split-ticket 
voting. Furthermore, controls are included for age, gen-
der, and political trust. Political trust in national institu-
tions might increase or decrease the odds of ticket-
splitting as we have seen that EP vote can be used to 
support or sanction the (parties in) government. Citizens 
employ proxies rooted in attitudes towards domestic 
politics in their attitudes towards European integration 
(Anderson, 1998; Duchesne et al., 2013). Moreover, citi-
zens who have more trust in political institutions tend to 
identify more strongly as European (Verhaegen & 
Hooghe, 2015). Trust in political institutions could thus 
moderate as well the relationship between EU-specific 
vote motives and split-ticket voting. 
4. Analyses 
Table 2 presents the proportion of the respondents in 
the PartiRep Election Studies of 2009 and 2014 that 
split their ticket between regional and EP elections. In 
both election years, a large majority of citizens voted 
for the same party in regional and in EP elections. 
Even though 18.59 to 28.99 per cent of the respond-
ents split their ticket, it is more likely that one voted for 
the same party in both elections. It can also be observed 
that in both election years, Flemish voters were more 
likely to split their ticket than Walloon voters. Finally, we 
see that both in Flanders and in Wallonia more respond-
ents split their ticket in 2014 than in 2009. Different vote 
motives might have inspired voters in 2014 and in 2009. 
This is in line with our first hypothesis.  
In order to test whether split-ticket voting could be 
explained by different factors in 2014 than in 2009, 
multivariate logistic regressions will be carried out for 
both elections, including the same explanatory and 
control variables. The significance of the explanatory 
variables will be compared between both models. The 
analyses are carried out for Wallonia and Flanders sep-
arately as each region has a separate party system. 
Table 2. Regional-European split-ticket voting in 2009 
and 2014 in Flanders and Wallonia. Source: PartiRep 
Election Study 2009, 2014. 
 2009 2014 
 %  N  % N  
Flanders 22.76% 201/883 28.99% 225/776 
Wallonia 18.59% 134/721 26.94% 167/620 
Note: Percentages of split-ticket voting are presented. 
This is the proportion of respondents that voted for a 
different party in the EP elections than in the regional 
elections.  
4.1. Explaining Split-Ticket Voting between Regional 
and European Levels: Comparing 2009 and 2014 Ballots 
The multivariate logistic analyses that include all explan-
atory and control variables are presented in Table 3. 
Similar (coded 0) or dissimilar (coded 1) party choices 
in regional and European elections as reported by the 
respondents are used as the dependent variable. These 
analyses show that not all bivariate relationships are 
robust when including control variables and alternative 
explanations. In the 2009 study in the Flemish sample, 
European identity and attitudes about EU integration 
show significant coefficients. In 2014, however, there is 
no significant relationship between European identity 
or support for EU integration and split-ticket voting in 
Flanders. Rather, uncertainty (i.e. changing party pref-
erence between the 2014 regional elections and the 
previous elections, and changing party preference be-
tween the 2014 regional elections and the first 2014 
survey wave) and voting for a specific candidate in EP 
elections show to be consistent explanations for split-
ticket voting in both 2009 and 2014 in Flanders. In the 
Walloon sample, part of the variation in split-ticket vot-
ing in 2009 can be explained by uncertainty of party 
preference exemplified by intra-campaign vote switch-
ing (between the first and the last survey wave of the 
2009 Study). Also, respondents who voted for a specific 
candidate in the 2009 EP elections were more likely to 
split their ticket. In 2014, the variance in split-ticket 
voting among Walloon respondents can be explained 
by both inter-campaign vote switching (between the 
2007 and 2009 elections), and by intra-campaign vote 
switching. Voting for a specific candidate is not signifi-
cantly related to split-ticket voting in Wallonia in 2014. 
Finally, voters who considered the economy as the 
most important issue when voting are not more likely 
to have split their ticket. All in all, our second set of hy-
potheses is largely invalidated. 
4.2. A Verhofstadt Effect in 2014? 
Five major Europarties designated candidates for the 
European Commission Presidency ahead of the Euro-
pean elections. One of them—the candidate of the 
ALDE—was the former Belgian Prime Minister, Guy 
Verhofstadt. A direct effect of his candidacy could be 
expected in Flanders where voters could directly vote 
for him, and an indirect effect in Wallonia where only 
the mechanism of indirect support could be at play 
through a vote for the MR (Mouvement Réformateur) 
party. Indeed, in Flanders, many respondents of our 
pool voted for Open VLD for the European elections 
even when they voted for a different party in the 2014 
regional elections, thereby increasing the declared vote 
for this party by 5.4 per cent between regional and Eu-
ropean elections. Thus, 16 per cent of the N-VA elec-
torate, 11.6 per cent of CD&V voters, 9.8 per cent of 
Sp.a voters, 12 per cent of the Groen electorate and 13.8 
per cent of Vlaams Belang voters at regional elections 
split their vote, throwing their support at Open VLD at 
the European level. In Wallonia, the MR records similar 
results for both elections, respectively 26.7 per cent and 
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Table 3. Explaining split-ticket voting between Regional and EP Elections in Flanders and Wallonia in 2009 and 2014. 
Source: PartiRep Election Study 2009 and PartiRep Election Study 2014. 








 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Economic vote motive     
Economy/financial crisis most important 
issue to decide vote 
0.030 (0.242) 0.344 (0.256) 0.094 (0.278) 0.748 (0.383) 
EU-specific vote motives     
European identity 0.743 (0.274)** 0.309 (0.310) 0.494 (0.329) 0.596 (0.472) 
Regional identity 0.360 (0.255) 0.154 (0.284) 0.393 (0.318) 0.204 (0.426) 
Attitude about EU integration (higher score is 
more positive towards further integration) 
-0.117 (0.049)* 0.026 (0.050) 0.048 (0.056) 0.010 (0.066) 
Alternative explanations     
Change vote between elections 0.898 (0.242)*** 0.869 (0.268)** 0.528 (0.282) 1.129 (0.462) * 
Change party preference between survey 
waves+ 
1.733 (0.246)*** 1.362 (0.281)*** 1.824 (0.297)*** 1.575 (0.432)*** 
Vote for candidate (vote for list is ref.) 1.429 (0.229)*** 0.751 (0.245)** 1.006 (0.346)** -0.059 (0.340) 
Political trust (national institutions) -0.062 (0.078) 0.019 (0.085) 0.018 (0.095) 0.049 (0.109) 
Control variables     
Age 0.002 (0.008) -0.015 (0.007)* -0.001 (0.009) -0.001 (0.011) 
Female -0.245 (0.233) -0.519 (0.275) -0.321 (0.279) 0.091 (0.343) 
Education (low is ref.)     
Middle 0.372 (0.318) 0.470 (0.325) 0.403 (0.377) -0.600 (0.485) 
High 1.020 (0.341)** 0.418 (0.333) 0.460 (0.379) 0.254 (0.439) 
Political interest 0.021 (0.053) -0.056 (0.059) -0.024 (0.068) -0.059 (0.063) 
Political knowledge 0.202 (0.085)* -0.080 (0.441) -0.053 (0.098) 0.065 (0.607) 
Intercept -3.410 (0.662)*** -1.945 (0.726) -3.389 (0.713)*** -2.855 (0.908)** 
N 661 439 487 326 
Pseudo-R² 23.47% 17.38% 19.32% 19.84% 
Note: Logistic regression with split-ticket voting as dependent variable. The results are weighted for age, gender and edu-
cation level. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. + In 2009, respondents’ vote in the regional elections is compared to their 
preference for the regional elections in the first wave; in 2014 party preference is not asked for the regional elections in 
wave 1, so the actual vote in the 2014 regional elections is compared to respondents’ preference for the federal elections 
in wave 1. 
27.4 per cent in regional and European ballots. In this 
last section, we test if the running of former Belgian 
Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt as Spitzenkandidat had 
an effect on split-ticket voting toward a candidate in 
2014. 
First, we observe no substantial difference when 
comparing percentages of respondents who declare to 
have voted for a specific candidate between Flanders 
(43.5 per cent) and Wallonia (43.8 per cent). Yet, voters 
mentioning voting for a specific candidate in EP elec-
tions (that is, casting one or multiple preference 
vote(s) rather than a vote for the entire list) were more 
likely to split their ticket in Flanders (34.3 per cent) 
than in Wallonia (24.3 per cent). Taking a closer look at 
who were the specific candidates the respondents 
casted their vote for, we observe that in Flanders, Guy 
Verhofstadt comes first with 32.5 per cent. In Wallonia, 
Louis Michel gathers 20.3 per cent. The descriptive re-
sults for the top three of specific candidates in Flanders 
and in Wallonia are presented in Table 4. 
More importantly, in Flanders, the respondents 
who declare to have voted for the former Prime Minis-
ter were more inclined to split their ticket between re-
gional and European elections, as 55.8 per cent of 
those who gave their vote to Verhofstadt in the EP elec-
tions did not vote for Open VLD in regional elections. 
The fact that other popular politicians, such as Louis 
Michel (MR), Marianne Thyssen (CD&V) or Marie Arena 
(PS), were less able to attract split-ticket voters is al-
ready an indication of what could be called a ‘Verhof-
stadt effect’ thus confirming hypotheses 3a and 3b. In 
sum, it seems that voting in for Verhofstadt EP elections 
helps to explain split-ticket voting. In the next section we 
test whether this relationship is robust when including 
control variables and alternatives explanations. 
In order to scrutinize the direct impact of the pres-
ence of a ‘Spitzenkandidat’ on the European list in Flan-
ders, and to test for an indirect effect in Wallonia, we 
use a multivariate analysis again that combines the eco-
nomic voting motives, the EU-specific vote motives, and 
alternative classical explanations. We also add indicators 
capturing a ‘Spitzenkandidat’ effect. Again, we use bina-
ry regression models to predict split-ticket voting (1) or 
straight-ticket voting (0). In a first step, we estimate two 
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Table 4. Top three of specific candidates mentioned by the respondents in Flanders and Wallonia in EP Elections (first 
mentioned, N=551). Source: PartiRep Election Study 2014. 









Flanders     
VERHOFSTADT Guy (Open VLD) 531,030 32.5 55.8 104 
THYSSEN Marianne (CD&V) 340,026 15.0 27.1 48 
VAN OVERTVELDT Johan (N-VA) 274,444 11.6 5.4 37 
Respondents declaring voting for a specific candidate   34.3 320 
Wallonia     
MICHEL Louis (MR) 264,550 20.3 25.5 47 
ARENA Marie (PS) 186,103 13.9 6.3 32 
ROLIN Claude (CDH) 75,521 10.0 21.7 23 
Respondents declaring voting for a specific candidate   24.3 231 
Note: Percentages of respondents mentioning specific candidates for those who declared a vote for a candidate and per-
centages of those mentioned one of the top three most-mentioned candidates that are split-ticket voters. + These data 
were computed by J. Dodeigne (Dodeigne, 2015). 
models, one for each region, which includes a dummy 
variable voting for Open VLD in EP elections or voting 
for MR in EP elections. This variable accounts for the 
fact that a ‘Spitzenkandidat’ effect could have played a 
role in leading more voters to turn to Open VLD and to 
its French-speaking counterpart, in order to support 
the candidacy of Guy Verhofstadt in the race for the 
Commission Presidency. Indeed, the Belgian electorate 
was at least—partly—aware of his candidacy to the 
Presidency of the Commission. In the survey commis-
sioned by the Alliance of European Conservatives and 
Reformists, 71 percent declared to be aware of the can-
didacy of Guy Verhofstadt when aided to answer the 
question (Alliance of European Conservatives and Re-
formists, 2014). Voters aware of his candidacy and will-
ing to support it should have logically privileged the na-
tional parties that stand for the ALDE—in Flanders, Open 
VLD and in Wallonia, indirectly through the MR. 
Models V and VI (see Table 5) confirm earlier pre-
sented results when introducing voting for Open 
VLD/MR in the models. In 2014, in both regions, neither 
economic vote motive nor EU-specific vote motives do 
significantly affect the odds of casting a split-ticket vote 
between regional and European ballots. The variances in 
split-ticket voting among respondents are related to 
both inter-elections vote switching and intra-campaign 
vote switching. More importantly, in Flanders, once we 
introduce voting for Open VLD, voting for a specific can-
didate rather than for a list does not significantly explain 
the probability of ticket-splitting any more. In other 
words, split-ticket voting can be significantly explained 
by voting for Open VLD at the European level. Respond-
ents who voted for Open VLD in EP elections often voted 
for a different party in Regional elections. In Wallonia, 
we do not find any trace of an indirect mechanism of 
support for the candidacy of Guy Verhofstadt as a 
Spitzenkandidat through a vote for the MR.  
In Model VII, we add a dummy variable to account 
for the declared vote for Guy Verhofstadt (1) or for 
(an)other candidate(s) (0) in Flanders. This last model 
hence verifies whether there was a ‘Verhofstadt effect’ 
on split-ticket voting in Flanders, even when controlling 
for the other identified motives of split-ticket voting. De-
claring to have voted for Guy Verhofstadt is found to be 
a crucial explanation for split-ticket voting in Flanders in 
2014. Also in this case, the effect of voting for a specific 
candidate in EP elections disappears at the expense of a 
strong and highly significant effect of voting for Verhof-
stadt. This result suggests that Flemish citizens who split 
their ticket did so in part because they specifically want-
ed to vote for Verhofstadt and possibly support his can-
didacy as Spitzenkandidat. This supports hypotheses 3a 
and 3b.  
5. Discussion 
Due to the differences between the context in which 
the 2014 and the 2009 EP elections took place, vote 
motives pertaining to both elections were expected to 
differ. More precisely, this article argued that European 
considerations should have mattered more in vote 
choices in 2014 and that this should be visible through 
increased levels of split-ticket voting. In the Belgian 
case, voters casted their vote for regional and EP elec-
tions on the same day. Hence, voters generally had the 
same attitudes and perceptions about the political and 
social situation when casting their different votes. We 
therefore tried to explain why voters did vote for a dif-
ferent party in the two ballots under scrutiny: the re-
gional and the European ones. The results of our anal-
yses show that the strength of respondents’ European 
identity, and their support for EU integration, signifi-
cantly explain split-ticket voting in the Flemish sample 
in 2009, but not in the 2014 or in the Walloon samples. 
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Table 5. ‘Spitzenkandidat Effect’ on Split-Ticket Voting between Regional and EP Elections in Flanders and Wallonia in 
2014. Source: PartiRep Election Study 2009 and PartiRep Election Study 2014. 






 b (SE) b (SE) b (SE) 
Economic vote motive    
Economy/financial crisis most important issue to decide 
vote 
0.185 (0.261) 0.719 (0.392) 0.196 (0.264) 
EU-specific vote motives    
European identity 0.447 (0.314) 0.588 (0.473) 0.367 (0.312) 
Regional identity 0.302 (0.297) 0.209 (0.425) 0.393 (0.318) 
Attitude about EU integration (higher score is more 
positive towards further integration) 
0.021 (0.052) 0.010 (0.066) 0.035 (0.052) 
‘Spitzenkandidat’ effect    
Vote for candidate 0.462 (0.263) -0.069 (0.341) 0.224 (0.286) 
Vote for Open-VLD/MR 1.128 (0.292)*** 0.179 (0.371)  
Vote for Verhofstadt   1.306 (0.337)*** 
Alternative explanations    
Change vote between elections 0.829 (0.274)** 1.118 (0.463)* 0.843 (0.275)** 
Change party preference between survey waves+ 1.315 (0.289)*** 1.594 (0.438)*** 1.344 (0.288)*** 
Political trust (national institutions) 0.039 (0.090) 0.054 (0.110) 0.014 (0.090) 
Control variables    
Age -0.011 (0.008) -0.001 (0.011) -0.111 (0.008) 
Female -0.534 (0.285) 0.102 (0.347) -0.443 (0.282) 
Education (low is ref.)    
Middle 0.599 (0.343) -0.642 (0.493) 0.564 (0.333) 
High 0.461 (0.344) 0.224 (0.449) 0.492 (0.340) 
Political interest -0.045 (0.060) -0.057 (0.062) -0.048 (0.060) 
Political knowledge -0.101 (0.441) 0.053 (0.609) -0.013 (0.439) 
Intercept -2.457 (0.772)*** -2.926 (0.930)** -2.224 (0.762)** 
N 439 326 439 
Pseudo-R² 20.50% 19.91% 20.17% 
Note: Logistic regression with split-ticket voting as dependent variable. The results are weighted for age, gender and edu-
cation level. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. + As in 2014 party preference was not asked for the regional elections in 
wave 1, the actual vote in the 2014 regional elections is compared to respondents’ preference for the federal elections in 
wave 1. 
Rather, uncertainty about the most favoured party 
(which is often the result of holding multiple party 
preferences or of having a weaker party identification) 
and voting for a specific candidate in EP elections 
proved to be the most robust explanation for split-
ticket voting in both regions of Belgium and in both 
elections accounted for in this study. Uncertainty ap-
pears in line with classical de-alignment-based explana-
tions of ticket-splitting, rather than as a change be-
cause of the specific context in which the 2014 EP 
elections took place. Voting for a specific candidate, al-
so largely corroborates classical explanations of ticket-
splitting, especially when considering the increasingly 
candidate-centred nature of the political system. Also, 
one could add that the structure of the ballot in Bel-
gium (semi-opened lists), whereby the head of the list 
is often meant to ‘pull the list’. As a result, to a large 
extent, logics pertaining to the national political con-
text and party system have prevailed. Yet, emitting a 
preference vote for one (or several) candidate(s) can 
be driven by characteristics of the candidate(s) that 
remain linked to national-level considerations (e.g. 
when a candidate has had an important role at the na-
tional or sub-national level before), or may be driven 
by European-level considerations (e.g. in cases when 
the candidate has a pronounced and visible opinion 
about EU policies and/or integration). While such dif-
ferentiation remains difficult to interpret in 2009, the 
analyses demonstrated that in 2014 a candidate effect 
could be attributed to the specific presence on the lists 
of Guy Verhofstadt.  
Our data provides mixed evidence for the claim that 
the 2014 EP elections were more dominated by Euro-
pean vote motives than previous EP elections. Both the 
financial crisis and the politicization of the EU have 
seemingly had a very limited effect on vote choices. 
The introduction of Spitzenkandidaten is, however, a 
notable exception and does seem to have had a direct 
effect. When Flemish voters switched to the liberal 
party for European elections, they were likely to tick 
the name of Verhofstadt. When voters could only indi-
rectly support Verhofstadt’s candidacy (as in Wallonia), 
no effect was found. This appears in line with the find-
ings of Hobolt (2014) who observed that in member 
states which are the home country of one or more of 
the Spitzenkandidaten, more citizens were aware of 
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the link between their vote and the selection of a new 
President of the European Commission. Our research 
adds to these observations that such a ‘Spitzenkandi-
dat effect’ has an impact on voting. Moreover, the 
presence of a direct effect, while an indirect effect 
seems to be absent, pleas in favour of the idea of direct 
elections for the President of the European Commis-
sion as one reaction to weak interest in EP elections 
among lay citizens. Furthermore, our research shows 
how the differentiation between national and Europe-
an vote motives is increasingly difficult to make. Euro-
pean elections in Flanders have at least to some extent 
been about a national personality as denounced by the 
‘democratic deficit’ literature (Føllesdal & Hix, 2006), 
while being at the same time about a major European 
figure. Critics of the second-order model have maybe 
been too quick in dismissing its central postulate. In 
the end, the issue is not so much about whether Euro-
pean vote motives matter in European elections but al-
so about how they may combine with national ones.  
The specificities of the Belgian case have hence 
largely allowed us to reconsider and further test the 
second-order model in the case of simultaneous elec-
tions. According to the Belgian Constitution following 
the Sixth State Reform, the federal elections should al-
ways be organised the same day as the European elec-
tions. Since their introduction, the regional elections 
have also been traditionally organised concomitantly 
with the European ballot. Although the regions do pos-
sess some leeway in adjusting the length of their legis-
latures and the date of elections, the Belgian case is 
likely to increasingly provide a prolific field of research 
for split-ticket voting in the future.  
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